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Coordinated networks of social media in uencers, especially small-scale in uencers with fewer
than 10,000 followers, are now a powerful asset for political campaigns, PACs, and special
interest groups. Partisan organizations are leveraging these “authentic” accounts in bids to sway
political discourse and decision-making in the run up to the 2020 U.S. elections. Political
marketers tell us that they see in uencers, particularly those with more intimate followings, as
regarded as more trustworthy by their followers and therefore better positioned to change their
behavior. Groups on both sides of the aisle are paying in uencers to promote their causes. Many
in uencers don’t reveal they’ve been paid, and payments often take place off social media
platforms. This amounts to a new and growing form of ‘inorganic’ information operations—elite-
dictated propaganda through trusted social media spokespersons. What is more, top-down
propaganda from in uencers are better able to evade detection systems built to detect political
bots and sockpuppets and to defy regulators concerned with digital free speech—all while using
in uencers’ captive audiences to more effectively prey upon fraught emotions during a highly
contentious election. Such in uencers, far from being “volunteer digital door knockers,” are paid,
highly organized surrogates of political campaigns failing to report this new mode of politicking.
Social media  rms and governments face serious challenges ahead in dealing with this new form
of digital propaganda. The propaganda research team at the Center for Media Engagement notes
these challenges and offers cursory solutions.
AN INFLUENCER “AWAKENING”
Sarah Smith’s  Instagram pro le is full of pictures documenting her journey as a mother and a
healthy living advocate living in Arizona. Sarah’s posts to her 27,800 followers are mostly about
motherhood, women supporting women, and living a “nature- rst” lifestyle.  She also shares
deeply personal details about her life, such as her experience separating from her son’s father
and the pain it has caused, interspersed with promotions for clean living brands. Against this
backdrop of sunlit photos of gardens in mountainous terrains, two tabs in her story highlights
labeled “WAKEUP” and “CoronaVirus” stand out from the others. The stories in “WAKEUP” are
dominated by misinformation regarding COVID-19, with one post claiming that children have a
0.00% chance of dying from the virus. A second post equates social distancing to CIA torture
techniques, while another claims the mainstream media is using race riots to distract from child-
traf cking and pedophilia.
In March of 2020, Sarah began posting politically charged content in her stories and Instagram
TV (IGTV) feed regarding masks, and sharing links to videos that have since been removed from
Instagram for spreading disinformation. In a controversial video posted May 24, Sarah alludes to
a conspiracy behind the mask mandates and encourages audience members to “do [their] own
research” into the topic. The video has over 24,700 views,  with many commenters asking to
reshare and others tagging the post with popular QAnon hashtags like #wwg1wga (the most
common QAnon rallying cry, meaning “where we go one, we go all.”) In a follow-up post about the
video, Sarah says, “I almost deleted my whole account late last night due to the overwhelming
amount of hateful comments I received on the video I posted yesterday…But I realized that I
actually have a responsibility to speak up,” re ecting the sentiments of a growing number of
lifestyle in uencers who post political content on Instagram. Several users commented on the
post that the video was the reason they began following her account.
Sarah’s story illustrates how social media “in uencers” can legitimize and spread harmful ideas,
as well as the way the incentive structures have changed for those who post this type of content.
Previously, lifestyle in uencers shied away from sharing controversial content due to fears of
alienating their audiences and risking brand partnerships.  But events of 2020 have catalyzed
changes in both audience expectations and the way in uencers view their responsibility to speak
about social issues.  Now, in uencers are being paid by campaigns and political consultants to
spread partisan content.
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Pundits and reporters in the U.S. have deemed 2020 the year  of many things  the woman
political donor, persuasion, and resentment and partisan rage.  But our research suggests it is
shaping up to be the year of the political in uencer: individuals who have built their social media
pro les into brands, often with the goal of cultivating followers in order to monetize their
in uence or gain prestige, and who are now using their platforms to discuss politics. Not only are
Americans spending a markedly increased amount of time on social media due to COVID-19,  but
voters are also immersed in this realm of in uencers. According to our research, in uencer
content has become politicized—ignited by resistance to COVID-19 precautions, QAnon
conspiracies, and protests following the May 25th murder of George Floyd. Furthermore,
economic instability and job loss have led to an increase in the number of people seeking to
become in uencers and an increase in effort spent monetizing in uence, especially among
small-scale, or “nano,” in uencers.  The value of social media in uencers has not gone unnoticed
by those seeking to shape political discourse and sway voters. In the words of one prominent
Democratic political strategist we interviewed: “We’re obsessed.”
Top-down political mobilization of networks of in uencers, particularly small-scale nano-
in uencers with less than 10,000 followers, by campaigns and political groups is a concerning
trend. The currency of social media in uencers, especially those with smaller audiences, is
authenticity.  Authenticity enables the forging of perceived intimate relationships with followers,
which in turn begets trust, loyalty, and internalization of messaging.  When politicians are
publicly endorsed by in uencers and celebrities, they can bene t from increased visibility, but
the central goal is often to transfer the trust followers feel towards the in uencer to a candidate
or cause.  Sometimes endorsements can back re if they appear contrived, or if the celebrity is
disliked or dismissed as a typical example of “liberal Hollywood.” On the other hand, networks of
in uencers—especially nano-in uencers who are more likely to evoke trust—speaking about
political issues and interweaving personal anecdotes are hypothesized to shift norms and sway
political discourse, conceivably in favor of a speci c candidate. Unfortunately, in uencer
disclosure of payment is poorly enforced, especially if the payment occurs off-platform, and
campaigns can employ layers of subcontracting to evade detection in their own  nancial reports.
Political action committees (PACs) can also use untraceable “dark money” to fund networks of
in uencers,  and it is possible that foreign actors could do so as well. Grassroots organizing can
be mimicked, particularly if small-scale in uencers are contacted individually and are unaware
that they are being coordinated. The challenge of detecting and removing real accounts, as
opposed to automated “bot” accounts, further complicates the issue. While some may regard
the coordination of in uencers as “virtual door-knocking,” if there is no disclosure of top-down









Since March of 2020, the Center for Media Engagement has been studying the role of
in uencers in the lead-up to the 2020 U.S. elections. We have conducted 14 in-depth interviews
with well-placed experts, ranging from political strategists who harness in uencers for their own
partisan means to executives of so-called “in uencer platforms” to governmental regulators and,
 nally, to the political in uencers themselves. We have also conducted an observational study of
in uencer “engagement pods:” groups of people who coordinate to increase engagement on one
another’s posts on social media. These pods are largely speci c to Instagram, marshalled both
formally through companies and informally through self-organization. Predicated on our
interviews, our work has focused primarily on Instagram, with additional insights from political
in uencers on TikTok.
Our  ndings are described in the following three sections: (1) The current political-in uencer
landscape, in which we explore the relational power of leveraging small-scale in uencers,
partisan differences in adoption of in uencers, and the logistics of coordinating a political
in uencer campaign; (2) How norms surrounding in uencer discourse have shifted on the
platforms in question, ignited by notable events in 2020 and motivated by in uencers’ personal
activism, audience expectations, and increased engagement following posts on certain topics;
and (3) Techniques used off-platform to coordinate content and arti cially enhance reach,
speci cally the investigation of pods and political Hype Houses on TikTok. The report concludes
with a discussion of the ethics of coordinating in uencers and cursory policy recommendations.
FINDINGS
The Current Political-In uencer Landscape
Both the Biden and Trump campaigns are employing “digital- rst” advertising strategies, with
varying degrees of success.  President Trump has a well-established online presence, with
roughly 86 million followers on Twitter and 29 million on Facebook, compared to Biden’s 10
million and 2.8 million followers, respectively.  Long-form web-based video interviews are
popular, with Trump often relying on surrogates, as is the case with Team Trump Online!, and
Biden often incorporating celebrity and in uencer guests to increase viewership. Trump himself
has conducted few interviews, capitalizing on his own in uencer status instead by retweeting
thousands of followers’ tweets and memes, bequeathing prized endorsements, and promoting
follower-generated content to his massive audience. Biden, whose team is working with the
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follower generated content to his massive audience. Biden, whose team is working with the
in uencer  rm Village Marketing, has been interviewed by a handful of lifestyle and parenting
in uencers, YouTube vloggers, and celebrities (notably, Cardi B  and Dwayne “The Rock”
Johnson ). While celebrity endorsement has long been a liberal tactic, the political mobilization
of in uencers, including those with small and large followings, is relatively new and is not without
challenges, particularly regarding authenticity and quality control.
Although highly visible, celebrity endorsements, interviews with mega-in uencers, and the
much-discussed Bloomberg Memes  are not the whole story of in uencers and the 2020
election. Our interviews reveal the appeal and power of in uencer networks, particularly those of
nano-in uencers, now being deployed by PACs, political strategy  rms, and social movements.
The most effective approach may be rallying small-scale in uencers, described in interviews as
“everyday people,” around a cause, not a candidate, and to help them to make their own
“authentic” content, enlivened by details of their personal narratives.
The Power of Small-Scale In uencers
The political appeal of harnessing nano-in uencers—accounts with fewer than 10,000 followers
—and other small-scale in uencers is manifold. Unlike celebrity accounts, such small-scale
in uencers are normal individuals whose primary occupations are not being in uencers, but
rather being active members of their local communities who have connections to their followers
of ine. Noted for their close relationships with their followers and signi cantly higher levels of
engagement, as they devotedly respond to questions and comments, these in uencers are more
likely to evoke the trust that people feel towards recommendations from friends and family.
Moreover, small-scale in uencers have the bene t of highly targetable audiences, who share
traits such as location, age, or a niche passion, which makes it easy for political actors to reach
speci c sects of voters to encourage or dissuade. Lastly, small-scale in uencers are
inexpensive,  enabling the mobilization of multitudes in order to target highly speci c
audiences with “authentic” political messaging.
Coordinating small-scale political in uencers is not without challenges. Not all in uencer
marketing platforms have small-scale in uencers. One political group that we spoke with created
their own database, painstakingly populated by searching Instagram and other platforms for
nano-in uencers’ contact information and contacting them individually. That said, small-scale
in uencers are an increasing focus in the commercial realm,  and the two well-known in uencer
marketing companies we spoke to had nano-in uencers on their rosters, re ecting increasing








demand from brands. Furthermore, even if small-scale in uencers must be coordinated
externally from the established platforms, they are likely to be  attered by the attention and may
work as volunteers in exchange for face-time with a candidate or political merchandise, as
mentioned by several of our interview subjects.
Partisan Differences in Adoption of In uencers
After Trump’s successful social media campaign in 2016, some marketing experts reported
feeling fed up with the lack of similar efforts on the Democratic side. Recognizing the unique way
in uencers could be used to target key demographic groups, especially in swing states, and
seeking to apply their business knowledge to politics, two in uencer  rm executives we spoke to
described pursuing partnerships with progressive campaigns, even going so far as to offer their
services for free or at reduced cost. “There’s a lot we can do on state and local elections as well.
We can  nd in uencers who live in [a] given area, in a given city, in a given town, and  nd people
whose audiences also live in that area,” one executive told us. Interestingly, they told us that most
of the Democratic campaigns they approached were not interested in working with them. Of the
few campaigns who were interested, most wanted to maintain control of the content and format
of the posts, undermining one of the alleged principal strengths of in uencer marketing:
perceived authenticity.  In the words of one in uencer  rm executive: “I think you get a lot of
campaign managers, they obviously like control and I think that that makes sense, but when you
work with in uencers, you have way less control.” Nevertheless, there are several prominent
Democratic in uencer efforts that are well underway, such as those led by Main Street One  and
NextGen,  which both prioritize the use of nano-in uencers, and by Village Marketing,  as well
as general in uencer branding guidelines publicly provided by the Biden campaign.  This hasn’t
stopped an advertising expert from claiming that political in uencer marketing is “wildly under-
utilized.”
Across the aisle, Republican groups appear to understand the utility of in uencers. According to
one politically agnostic in uencer  rm we spoke to, the Republican campaigns that approached
them demonstrated a better grasp of how the in uencer platforms could be used to mobilize
hyper-speci c audiences, as opposed to simply partnering with well-known in uencers, as their
Democratic counterparts were doing.  The GOP has equipped “Rising Stars” with social media
training and invited young, minority in uencers to the RNC headquarters to discuss how to
in uence conversations in their local communities.  Without apparent GOP oversight, there are
also collections of in uencers who have gathered into “hype houses” on TikTok. They have large-
scale reach: the Conservative Hype House has 1.5 million followers and the Republican Hype









House has nearly 900,000.  Coordinated with greater GOP guidance, the conservative youth
group Turning Point USA has a well-established In uencer Media Program with a reported 260
in uencers who have an average following of 170,000 people.  An af liate, Turning Point Action,
was recently found to be operating an in uence operation described as “among the most
ambitious domestic in uence campaigns discovered this election cycle.”  Operating through an
external digital marketing  rm, Turning Point Action paid individuals, including minors, to use
their personal accounts to spread coordinated content without disclosing their af liation or
payment. Thousands of posts, replies, and comments across Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram
were found, some of which used identical language. The coordinated content spread false
information about COVID-19 and mail-in ballot fraud, sought to discredit mainstream media,
implicate Joe Biden, and promote Republican candidates.  Due to evidence of coordination,
particularly comments replicated en masse, Facebook and Twitter removed several accounts for
violating manipulation and spam policies.
Logistics: Coordinating an In uencer Campaign
Those seeking to coordinate political in uencers can work with in uencers on existing marketing
platforms, assemble their own rosters through outreach, or do a combination of both. By using
in uencer marking platforms, campaigns are able to post advertising requests and select
in uencers based upon their style and, importantly, the demographics of their audiences. Taking
this a step further, one group we spoke with gathers data from social listening software—
extracting data from posts, news articles, web searches and the like—to determine what
messages are most effective. They pair this data with traditional marketing tools like Brandwatch
and customer relationship management platforms (CRMs), and then use in uencer platforms to
choose in uencers whose content will reach speci c voters who are perceived to be most
receptive to that messaging. According to an executive from the group, there is also an ongoing
effort within their organization to build a proprietary database of in uencers by scraping social
media platforms for progressive in uencers and their followers, segmenting them based on
characteristics like age, gender, and location to call on for future campaigns.  The  rm focuses
on using nano-in uencers because they tend to be highly trusted by their audiences as
messengers. In uencer campaigns run by the  rm emphasize narrative-style messaging with a
local touch to mimic the appearance of grassroots organization.
Norm Shifting: Increasing Politicization and Extremism on Social Media Platforms 
Echoed across interviews was the sentiment that there has been a distinct shift in Instagram’s








in uencer culture over the last year. With the murder of George Floyd and subsequent protests,
the COVID-19 pandemic, and the spread of QAnon, in uencers have begun to post content that
would have previously been considered too controversial. Our research identi ed three main
motivations behind this shift in in uencer postings: the desire to use platforms for political
activism, changes in audience expectations, and the incentivization of posting political content
due to increased follower engagement.
Motivation: Personal Political Activism
In the words of one in uencer we interviewed: “My whole thing was that I wanted to spread a
message that was meaningful. I wanted to make a difference in society, one way or another. I
didn’t feel like I was doing enough.” The current in ux of personally motivated political activism is
causing ripple effects throughout the social media landscape, provoking and inspiring others,
and, subsequently, establishing an expectation of political discourse. While this type of content
may invigorate the in uencer’s audience, it can also, conversely, invigorate those in opposition.
One popular conservative in uencer we spoke with told us that their primary motivation for
becoming a partisan in uencer was the activity they saw on social media during police protests
in the wake of the murder of George Floyd: “The main catalyst for me to start making content
was after I saw people, you know, burning  ags, stepping on  ags, it kind of brought out this
passion that was lost.” Once the apolitical norm of Instagram was broken en masse—arguably by
the controversial “Blackout Tuesday” meme accompanied by Black Lives Matter hashtags —
political posts have bred political posts, regardless of whether they are authentic or
performative.
Motivation: Audience Expectations
According to those we spoke with, a main driving factor for in uencers to post this new kind of
politically-charged content is a general change in audience demand. Since in uencers operate in
an engagement-driven system, when their audiences expect them to speak about social issues,
the in uencers have to respond. In the words of one in uencer platform executive: “It’s become a
place where in uencers are expected to say something, and they are expected to be on the right
side of history if they want to continue to operate their businesses.” Especially for nano-
in uencers, whose audiences are smaller and highly engaged, these kinds of posts in support of
a social movement can become a price of doing business. In the past, such posts may have been
decried as “armchair activism” or “slacktivism,” but now, authentic or performative, they are
expected.
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Motivation: Increased Engagement and Followers
Social media platforms have long been fertile ground for the spread of conspiracy theories and,
in 2020, countless “mainstream” in uencers, from  tness gurus to beauty bloggers, have joined
the ranks of those spreading the content. A prime example is QAnon, a conspiracy theory that
came out of the fringe message board site 4chan in 2017.  The conspiracy theory alleges that
Donald Trump is defending the world against a large network of satanic elites who are running a
global child-traf cking operation. QAnon has found its way into mainstream platforms through
the co-option of existing social causes like the anti-vaccination and anti-child-traf cking
movements.  Using language like “#savethechildren,” many QAnon posts appear innocuous
upon  rst glance—moms speaking out against child abuse and sex-traf cking—but the posts are
often also tagged with hashtags like #thegreatawakening and #wwg1wga, which lead followers
to more radical conspiratorial content. QAnon followers are extremely active, and these hashtags
also help them, and QAnon automated “bot” accounts,  to “signal boost” to other members,
which leads to masses of comments, likes, and reshares of the content. Posts often encourage
people to do their own research into topics, and even suggest what web browser to use to do so,
giving preference to those which index alternative news sources higher in the search results.
In uencer culture that thrives on authenticity and being an individual  ts well with these kinds of
messages that encourage individuality in pursuit of the truth (e.g. questioning mainstream media,
the government, and academia).  Posts focused on rescuing children and other QAnon adjacent
talking points also represent a “watered-down” version of the core QAnon content, enabling it to
be more palatable and sharable for ordinary people, and shifting the norms regarding acceptable
discourse.  QAnon is no longer a fringe theory; 2 out of 10 Americans think it is “very good” or
“somewhat good” for the country, and 4 in 10 Republicans believe the same.  From our
interviews, it appears to be an established tactic for in uencers to capitalize on QAnon to get a
boost in followers and engagement, even if the engagement isn’t sustained.  A recent study of
climate change deniers found that they have begun to use QAnon hashtags and post QAnon
content, gaining a marked increase in engagement.
Off-Platform Engagement Manipulation: In ation and Coordination 
Engagement Pods in the United States 
Since Instagram changed its algorithm in 2016 from prioritizing posts based on chronological











order to a more complex and evolving system based on user preference and engagement,
in uencers have had to  nd new ways to get their content into their follower’s feeds.  Fake
in uencer marketing, which includes the purchase of fake followers and likes and the use of bots
to increase engagement, is predicted to cost brands $1.5 billion in 2020, not including the costs
to user trust when these tactics are employed.  Within this fake engagement ecosystem,
engagement “pods” have formed as a less detectable way to manipulate engagement on
Instagram due to their use of actual users instead of automated methods.  Pods, which allow
users to trade engagement in the form of comments, likes, and follows, are often run on
encrypted messaging applications like WhatsApp and Telegram, but also appear in Facebook
groups and in direct message groups on Instagram. Although many pods are self-forming groups
of niche users who post in a similar genre, some of the largest groups are run by companies who
also sell other forms of fake engagement. Wolf Global, which runs over 50 engagement pods on
Telegram and claims to have over 500,000 members, also sells “real USA followers” and auto-
liking as premium services.  The groups themselves are monitored by bots that remove inactive
members and check for member violations like leeching engagement without engaging back.
Because pods are made up of real users, the activity is harder to detect than the use of fake
pro les and bots. Wolf Global also encourages its users to leave “quality comments” by
pretending they are friends with the poster, and to avoid generic phrases like, “this is great,” or,
“love your pro le.” Although Wolf Global’s groups have a zero-tolerance policy for content
containing offensive content like violence and hate, they have no clear guidelines surrounding
the sharing of political content for engagement. In March of 2020, the company also added
warnings and “additional monitoring measures” for posts related to the coronavirus, warning
users that anyone found spreading disinformation regarding COVID-19 would be banned from
the groups. These policies highlight a key concern regarding ampli cation of harmful messaging
through the use of pods. One expert who studies pods explained that these groups have the
ability to boost the content in an inorganic way, which poses serious concerns when it comes to
politics. “What you’re getting in a pod is you’re magnifying sort of a pre-cooked message or view.
So, from a political point of view…you’re not hearing from stakeholders outside the pod… it tends
to create a distortion, almost a distortion of actual reality.” Pods can enable bad actors to amplify
and spread harmful messages in a more organic-appearing way than using automated methods.
And because pods tend to be segmented by types of accounts, such as mommy in uencers and
travel in uencers, pods can make it appear as though a certain type of messaging is popular with
a speci c type of user on the platform.





TikTok, the controversial  Chinese-owned video sharing platform with a reported 100 million
monthly users in the United States,  62% of whom are aged 10 to 29,  has become a hotbed of
“Gen Z” and millennial political commentary. Collectives of political in uencers, organized into a
variety of conservative or liberal “hype houses,” have become popular. Several of the collectives
are owned by companies that control multiple accounts and merchandise companies.
We spoke with two in uencers who are members of political hype houses to understand how
they coordinate and enhance their in uence. First, they recruit a small network of like-minded
in uencers. Then, to gain traction, they use established tactics such as doing popular dances and
“every beat you drop a fact,” and targeting “14-year-olds and middle schoolers” because they are
a highly engaged and malleable audience. In the candid words of one of the in uencers: “When
you target to the most manipulatable audience it’s going to be really easy to gain a following and
have people worship what you’re saying.” Once they create an established account with well-
curated content, they recruit more in uencers. The hype house has multiple tiers of in uencers,
based upon quality of content and number of followers, and a council of main brand ambassadors
that initiates new in uencers, manages partner accounts, handles the selling of merchandise,
and, most interestingly, coordinates the topics and messaging that they would like to see from
their in uencers. The message coordination meeting takes place once a week: “Let’s not talk
about this, we need to focus on this. Or maybe it’s, you know, hey, for the long term, we’re going
to be making content about this over the next couple of weeks.” However, our interviewee was
quick to stress that “it’s not strict,” adding “it’s their own personal accounts and they can post
anything that they really want.”
These groups of charismatic young people who post enthusiastically about politics, with their
several hundred thousand to million-plus followers, seem ripe for marshaling by traditional
political campaigns, PACs, and strategists. However, the two in uencers we interviewed had not
received marching orders or payment from external sources. Their only source of payment came
from selling merchandise, if they made money at all. “Most of us, we do this without any payment,
because we want to educate society. And we want to educate young people, it’s a very important
time in our history… We almost see it as a duty and not necessarily a job.” That said, we were only
able to interview two of many, and it is easy to see the potential symbiosis of PACs and
campaigns coordinating messaging through political hype houses, be they paid in money,
connections, or simply recognition from an admired politician.




Is coordinating networks of in uencers to share political content ethical? On the one hand, some
argue that it is no different than conventional volunteer work. In the words of one strategist, “This
is digital door-knocking, I think of this as e-canvassing.” However, there are three key differences:
(1) scale of reach, (2) in uencers’ relationships with their audiences, and (3) disclosure and
transparency regarding coordination. In uencers differ from canvassers because a single post
can reach thousands of people in an instant versus the reach of a canvasser who is knocking on a
single door or calling a single number at any given time. There is also a relational difference
between a canvasser knocking on a stranger’s door and an in uencer whose audience has a
relationship with them, perceived or otherwise. Lastly, canvassers gain trust by af liating with a
campaign so they are willing to disclose, while in uencers gain trust by remaining “authentic.”
Lack of disclosure regarding payment or af liation make it extremely dif cult to assess
coordination, enabling secretive political groups, dark money,  and foreign actors to potentially
sway masses of unsuspecting voters through the voices of trusted friends and idols.
By focusing on disclosure, proponents of paid political in uencers overlook the deeper issue of
digital astrotur ng—the coordination of accounts, deceptively seeking to mimic legitimate
discourse.  In recent years, social media bots were a primary method of arti cially in ating a
candidate’s popularity online,  but as technologists have become more adept at detection, bot
usage appears to be waning. User-generated content is both effective at swaying public opinion
and creating the appearance of a groundswell of grassroots support. Coordinating real humans
to post political content, although more time consuming, is also a tactic to avoid detection. As
discussed prior, in the lead-up to the 2020 election, Turning Point Action reportedly paid
teenagers in Arizona to reply to tweets posted by Democratic politicians and news organizations
on Twitter in order to manipulate conversations on the platform.  The teenagers, who were
pulling approved messages from a shared document, did not disclose that they were working in
coordination with a political group and several used pseudonyms. Notably, Turning Point Action
claimed that this coordinated effort was “sincere political activism” that was pushed online due
to COVID-19,  echoing the justi cations we heard from strategists coordinating political
in uencers on Instagram.
CONCLUSION: Policy Solutions Stymied
In uencers pose a threat to campaign transparency, accountability, and informational quality.
Political in uencer posts do not qualify for the stricter rules imposed by Instagram, Facebook,






and Twitter on political advertising due to the fact that payment occurs off  platform. Without
standardization of disclosure practices, differentiating between coordinated political campaigns
and genuine grassroots political speech will continue to be dif cult for the platforms.
Furthermore, the Federal Elections Commission—which could change the legal requirements
surrounding these kinds of political advertisements—once again  nds itself without a quorum,
leaving it powerless to act.  The commission itself has also become increasingly polarized in
recent years, and disclosure has become a party-line issue. Current rules regarding online
political speech are “technology-neutral and platform- agnostic,” leaving social media platforms
and campaigns to make up many of the policies themselves.  The environment has been
described by one former Federal Election Commissioner we interviewed as a place where bad
actors “can just act with impunity, and there’s never going to be any enforcement.”
Lack of proper disclosure regulations leaves signi cant openings for dark money and foreign
actors to fund in uencer operations with little to no detection, threatening the security and
integrity of elections in the United States and beyond. Russian in uence operations in Africa have
been testing tactics to spread disinformation by using local people instead of fake accounts to
avoid detection of Facebook.  As Facebook and Twitter focused more attention on foreign
actors after the 2016 election, the Kremlin’s Internet Research Agency successfully targeted
black Americans on Instagram by mimicking in uencer behavior as a part of an orchestrated
disinformation campaign in 2017.
In order to combat the rise of political in uencers, both the federal government and social media
 rms must act. While some precedents have been set for monitoring in uencers paid for
commercial purposes, the use of political in uencers is different. Ultimately, the use of paid
political in uencers amounts to active, professional electioneering. It should be treated as such.
Even when in uencer groups are not paid to communicate by political groups, as seems to be the
case with the “hype houses” mentioned earlier, they are often using inorganic organizing tactics
in bids to game what social media  rms prioritize in trends and recommendations. The use of
broadscale coordination of in uencers, particularly small-scale nano-in uencers who are
basically “regular” users, in efforts to dictate outcomes on digital systems amounts to
computational propaganda by other means. Here, political groups may not be using bots or
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